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W hen firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for acompetitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what hap-
pens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is
used: exclusive capacity and first-priority capacity. We model firms’ investment and production decisions, and analyze the
equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is
a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one
firm taps into the other firm’s invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually dis-
courages firms’ investment. We also characterize the firms’ and supplier’s preference about the capacity type. While the
non-investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first-priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to
shut off the other firm’s access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to
invest. The supplier’s preference depends on the trade-off between over-investment and flexibility.
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1. Introduction
In many supply chains, multiple firms source from the
same set of suppliers. Such supply chain structures ben-
efit from achieving economies of scale and obtaining
reliable and high-quality supply, but there are also risks
such as the firms being exposed to shortage of supplies
or greater vulnerability to supply disruptions. In order
to mitigate the risks, many firms invest in shared sup-
pliers, even if the firms compete against each other.
For example, firms may invest in the supplier to
expand the supplier’s capacity, avoid the supplier’s
bankruptcy, or improve the quality of products. A
major cosmetic brand directly invested in its South
Korean supplier, Cosmax, which also served many
other cosmetic companies. Intel invested in ASMI by
purchasing 4% of its common shares to foster material
development (LaPedus 2009), even though ASMI is a
supplier to AMD. Of course, firms invest in suppliers
not just for capacity expansion; for instance, GM pro-
vided $210 million to AAM in 2009 to keep it out of
bankruptcy (Haywood 2009), and Walmart sent
experts to help Chinese suppliers improve sustain-
ability while the suppliers also supply to other retail-
ers (Aston 2009). In the literature, these investments
can be considered as a part of “supplier develop-
ment” (Handfield et al. 2000).
When a firm invests in a shared supplier, there is a
natural competitive threat: the competitors may take
advantage of the firm’s investment, which would
intensify the competition and therefore reduce the
investing firm’s profits. To avoid this, the investing
firm may impose contractual constraints on the sup-
plier that dictate exactly how the increased capabilities
can be used. In this study, we specifically focus on the
contractual relationships governing firms’ investments
in the supplier’s capacity and their consequences.
One example that illustrates the framing of our
model is Foxconn’s recent investment in Sharp. In
2012, Foxconn (Hon Hai Precision Industry Co.)
invested $1.6 billion in Sharp: the investment included
a 46.5% stake in a single LCD factory in Sakai, Japan,
and an agreement to buy 50% of the panels produced
from the factory (Dignan 2012). In this case, Foxconn
claimed exclusive use of the 50% capacity, while Sharp
was free to use the remaining 50% for others, including
Sharp’s own products in the tablet and TV markets.
Another motivation to invest in a shared supplier is
to prevent other firms from receiving preferential
treatment. When a significant portion of the supplier’s
capacity could be first tapped by the investing
firm, the non-investing firm is at disadvantage in
meeting the demand. This concern partly explains
why Samsung also invested in Sharp shortly after
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Foxconn’s investment. It was reported that Samsung
invested $110 million in Sharp to “prevent its compet-
itor, particularly Hon Hai and Apple, from gaining
too much control,” and “secure a steady supply of
LCD panels” (Osawa and Lee 2013).
In this study, we consider a supply network where
two firms compete in the market while sharing a sup-
plier, and examine how the different contractual forms
affect the firms’ investment decisions and resulting
profits for the two firms and the supplier. When a sup-
plier serves competing firms, evaluating the benefit of
investment is not trivial. Investment provides a buyer
increased access to the supplier’s capacity, but such
investment is costly and may benefit the competing
firm if it also has more access to the capacity (a spill-
over effect). To prevent unintended spillover, buyers
often restrict the use of the invested resources so that a
buyer has enough capacity to satisfy its demand.
Therefore, for both supplier and buyer, the economics
of investment becomes more complex with presence
of competing firms. In this study, we develop a model
that captures the investment decisions of competing
firms, and study the consequences of the contractual
restriction that governs the capacity use.
We examine two common restrictions used in prac-
tice: Exclusive (the investing firm gets exclusive access
to the invested capacity), and First-Priority (one firm
can access the unused portion of the other firm’s
invested capacity, if any). We characterize equilibrium
outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms
and capacity levels. We show that, fewer firms invest
as the fixed investment cost increases, and within a
regime where the number of investing firms remains
the same, the capacity level decreases in the variable
capacity cost. We identify when and to what extent
the spillover effect occurs. The spillover occurs only
when the fixed cost is intermediate under the first-pri-
ority capacity. We also show that the variable cost
affects how much capacity the investing firm will
build and consequently how much capacity the com-
peting firm may tap into. We next examine the impact
of the spillover effect on the supply chain perfor-
mance by comparing the exclusive and first-priority
capacity. We observe that the spillover can curb com-
petition between the firms and discourage investment.
In equilibrium, the first-priority capacity is lower than
the exclusive capacity, and so is the number of invest-
ing firms. On the other hand, the spillover effect may
help both firms by reducing the chance of the firms
being trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Given the observation about the equilibrium capac-
ity levels, we further examine which type of capacity
that the buying firms and the supplier prefer. We find
the buying firms’ preference depends on two effects:
the leading effect when the firm becomes the only
investor and has advantages in accessing capacity,
and the spillover effect when the non-investing firm
taps into the invested capacity. In contrast to naive
intuition, we show that the investing firm does some-
times prefer the first-priority capacity. This is because
restricting the capacity can trigger the other firm
also to invest and intensify the competition. The
non-investing firm, however, always prefers the first-
priority capacity as it can access more capacity. The
supplier’s preference is driven by the trade-off
between the over-investment in the exclusive capacity,
and the flexibility in utilizing the first-priority capacity.
Building on this, we discuss which type of capacity
will be chosen in the supply chain under two scenarios.
When the supplier can dictate the capacity type, the
exclusive capacity is likely to emerge as the ultimate
choice. On the other hand, when the investing firm
determines the capacity type, the first-priority capac-
ity may also emerge as the ultimate choice.
1.1. Literature Review
Our work falls within the literature of supplier devel-
opment, which refers to a buyer’s efforts to identify,
measure, and improve supplier performance (Hand-
field et al. 2000, Krause et al. 1998). Many papers in
this area have studied different ways to improve sup-
ply chain efficiency by buying firms’ investment in
cost reduction (Iyer et al. 2005), quality (Zhu et al.
2007), capacity (Li 2013, Li and Debo 2009), reliability
(Wang et al. 2010), and financial subsidy (Babich
2010). In all these papers, there is a single buyer; none
of the above papers consider the case of competing
firms investing in a shared supplier.
Two papers study firms investing in a shared sup-
plier to improve the reliability. Wadecki et al. (2012)
show that, when firms compete, they are less likely to
invest in a shared supplier. Wang et al. (2014) con-
sider the knowledge spillover associated with invest-
ing in a shared supplier, and show spillover often
improves the firms’ profits. Both papers consider a
binary yield model thus there is no competition for
the supplier’s capacity. In contrast, the supplier’s lim-
ited capacity, and its allocation to each firm under the
two capacity types, are key features of our model.
Our paper is also related with the capacity manage-
ment literature. A number of papers including (Plam-
beck and Taylor 2005, €Ulk€u , et al. 2005, 2007, Van
Mieghem 2003) survey and deal with various issues
in managing supplier’s capacity. In this stream, two
papers are related to our work. Li et al. (2011) con-
sider how capacity reservation options and access fee
affect the supplier’s profit. Qi et al. (2013) examine
how the market environment and demand correlation
affect a firm’s decision in sharing unused capacity of
a supplier. This paper differs from the two papers in
two aspects. First, our model considers a market
where firms compete against each other. Thus, a
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central question is how competition affects investment
decision. Second, in contrast to the two papers, our
model features stochastic capacity due to uncertain
yields or technology.
2. Model
We consider a supply chain with a supplier
(denoted by s), and two competing firms (i = 1,2).
The supplier produces a new product (or compo-
nent), and sell it at a wholesale price c to both
firms. Thus, in the absence of capacity investment,
both firms are ex ante symmetric. The two firms
compete a la Cournot in the market with the inverse
demand function: Pðq1; q2Þ ¼ a  bðq1 þ q2Þ, where
a is the total market size, and b the price sensitivity
parameter.
The supplier needs to build capacity to fulfill orders.
Prima facie, the supplier incurs the investment cost for
the capacity. At this stage, buying firms have opportu-
nities to invest in the supplier’s capacity. In return for
the investment, the firms are endowed with a portion
of capacity, for which the firms can impose restrictions
on how the capacity is used. Details of these restric-
tions will determine the amount of capacity that firms
can use at their discretion, and the output produced
for each firm. To capture this, we consider a two-stage
model. In the first stage, firms decide whether to invest
in the supplier, and if so, by how much. In the second
stage, the firms set order quantities and compete. We
assume that the capacity investment cost includes both
a fixed cost, w0, and a variable cost, w. Here, the fixed
cost may represent the cost associated with commis-
sioning and starting up a new facility, and the variable
cost may represent the cost of tools or new workers
which is proportional to the size of the investment.
We assume that firms do not know exactly the yield
of capacity at the time of investment. This assumption
reflects the fact that many factors besides capital invest-
ment (e.g., physical capacity, available technology, pro-
cess yield, and staffing plan) influence the realized
capacity at the time of production. This assumption is
consistent with the literature on unreliable suppliers
(e.g., Wadecki et al. 2012, Wang et al. 2014) and is
appropriate for modeling capacity in high-tech indus-
tries, agriculture, and vaccine production.
Specifically, the supplier’s total capacity is
Ks ¼ ðk0 þ k1 þ k2Þn, where k0 represents the sup-
plier’s base capacity, kiði ¼ 1; 2Þ is the capacity level
invested by firm i, and ξ is a random variable with
support [0,1] reflecting the yield between the realized
capacity and the theoretical maximum capacity
projected at the time of investment. It follows that the
supplier’s total capacity stochastically increases as the
buying firms’ investment increases. The fact that all
the three parts of the supplier’s capacity, k0n, k1n, and
k2n are positively correlated, reflects that these capaci-
ties are built for the same product at the supplier’s site,
which are subject to the same risk of random yield.
In return for the investment, firms can restrict how
the endowed capacity should be used. While there are
different restrictions used in practice, a widely used
choice is making capacity “exclusive”: a firm exclu-
sively uses the invested capacity, and disallows any
other use even if there is leftover. Another widely
used form is that the investing firm demands to fulfill
its own order first (“first priority”), but the supplier is
free to use any leftover.
If neither firm invests in the supplier, then both firms
are identical from the perspective of the supplier. In
this case, no priority will be given to either firm. If the
sum of order quantities is less than the supplier’s
capacity, allocation is trivial. When the total quantity is
greater than the supplier’s capacity, we use the uniform
allocation rule used in Cachon and Lariviere (1999) and
Sprumont (1991). Under the uniform allocation, if one
firm orders more than the other firm, it will receive the
minimum of its own order quantity and the capacity
left from serving the other firm. Unlike other allocation
rules that can induce order inflation, the uniform allo-
cation rule is known to be truth-inducing, and non-
manipulable; Both firms order their preferred quantities
within the limits of an upper bound that enforces the
capacity constraint. We assume that the uniform alloca-
tion rule is common knowledge in our game. Since we
assume that the two buying firms are ex ante identical,
if neither firm invests, the supplier is effectively allocat-
ing one-half of the capacity to each firm in equilibrium;
if the firms’ order quantities exceed capacity, they will
each get one-half following the uniform allocation rule.
Thus, if neither firm invests, we use ξ to represent the
realization of ξ, and then firm i’s capacity level is k02 n.
Under the exclusive contract, if firm i (i = 1,2) does
not fully use the initial endowed capacity of ðk02 þ kiÞn,
any remaining capacity will be wasted. On the other
hand, under the first-priority contract, the investing
firms demand to fulfill their orders first, but the sup-
plier is free to use any leftover to fulfill other orders.
That is, firm i can order up to ðk02 þ kiÞn plus any left-
over from the other firm’s invested capacity ðk02 þ kjÞn,
i 6¼ j. That means if the firm with larger capacity has
some leftover, the firm with smaller capacity is able to
use the leftover part. Likewise, if the firm with smaller
capacity has some leftover, the firm with larger capac-
ity is also able to use the leftover.
To further illustrate the first-priority capacity, suppose
firm i invests in a higher capacity level than firm j:
ki  kj. As firms compete on the same Cournot market,
it can be shown that, in any equilibrium, if firm j does
not utilize all of its invested capacity, then firm iwill also
have leftover capacity. However, even when firm j
exhausts its invested capacity, firm imay still have some
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leftover that firm jmay use in equilibrium. Thus, in equi-
librium, the only firm who will use the leftover capacity
is the firm with smaller capacity. Consequently, under
the first-priority capacity, firm i can order up to
ðk02 þ kiÞn, while firm j can order up to its capacityðk02 þ kjÞn plus any leftover capacity fromfirm i.
The remaining sequence of events is as follows.
After the capacity has been realized, firms place their
orders (with quantities specified by q1 and q2) subject
to the above capacity constraints and compete in the
downstream market. Therefore, firm i’s second-stage
profit is given as qiPðq1; q2Þ  cqi. Likewise, the sup-
plier’s second-stage revenue is simply cðq1 þ q2Þ.
The total profit of each firm is the expected second-
stage profit, minus investment cost, if any. We assume
that the buyer’s investment is entirely used to build
capacity, so the supplier’s overall profit is the expected
value of cðq1 þ q2Þ. Note that relaxing this assumption
does not change our results. For ease of exposition, we
assume that neither the firms nor the supplier incurs
any other costs, although incurring additional unit
production costs at both firms will not change the ana-
lytical findings. We assume that firms and supplier are
profit-maximizing, risk-neutral agents, and all game
parameters are common knowledge.
Remark on sequence of events. In our model, we
frame the sequence of events as firms first invest in
the supplier. Then the capacity is realized, and firms
place orders and serve the market. However, an alter-
native framework to interpret the sequence of events
is that firms invest in and order from the supplier
before the capacity uncertainty is resolved. Then, after
the capacity is realized, firms adjust production deci-
sions. In Appendix S4, we show that this alternative
sequence does not change our results and insights.
3. Exclusive Capacity Contract
We first analyze the exclusive capacity case, that is, the
invested capacity cannot be accessed by the other firm.
To determine an equilibrium, we solve the game by
backward induction. Therefore, we present the analysis
for the second-stage quantity game for given realized
capacity, and then solve the first-stage investment game.
3.1. Second-Stage Quantity Game
Following section 2, let ðk1; k2Þ denote the capacity
investment of the two firms. Given the realized sup-
plier capacity ks ¼ ðk0 þ k1 þ k2Þn and investment
decisions in the first stage, firms set quantities ðq1; q2Þ
subject to constraints. At ðq1; q2Þ, the market clearing
price, Pðq1; q2Þ, is given by Pðq1; q2Þ ¼ a  bðq1 þ q2Þ.
The equilibrium production quantities are deter-
mined by solving the following:
pe1ðk1; k2; nÞ ¼ max
q1 ðk02þk1Þn
q1Pðq1; q2Þ  cq1; and
pe2ðk1; k2; nÞ ¼ max
q2 ðk02þk2Þn
q2Pðq1; q2Þ  cq2:
The equilibrium order quantities and resultant prof-
its when k1 k2 are presented in Lemma 1. The
results are symmetric for case k1\ k2, thus omitted.
For ease of exposition, throughout the paper, we use
m0ðk1; k2Þ to represent the unit margin if neither firm
is constrained by the invested capacity ðk1; k2Þ when
ordering optimally. Likewise, under a subgame per-
fect equilibrium m1ðk1; k2Þ represents the unit margin
if only one firm is constrained by the invested
capacity ðk1; k2Þ. As we assume k1  k2 and firms
compete in the Cournot market, if only one firm is
constrained, that firm can only be firm 2. Similarly,
we use m2ðk1; k2Þ to represent the unit margin if both
firms are constrained. For simplicity, we suppress
the dependency of miðk1; k2; nÞ on ðk1; k2; nÞ when
there is no confusion. All proofs are relegated to the
appendix. We define miðk1; k2; nÞ as follows, where
ks ¼ ðk0 þ k1 þ k2Þn.
m0ðk1; k2; nÞ ¼ a c
3
;
m1ðk1; k2; nÞ ¼
a bðk02 þ k2Þn c
2
;
m2ðk1; k2; nÞ ¼ a bks  c:
LEMMA 1 (FIRMS’ EQUILIBRIUM ORDER QUANTITY AND EX
POST PROFIT). Let the capacity investment sizes be ðk1; k2Þ.
The resulting subgame yields the following:
Realized yield ξ Order quantity ðq1 ; q2Þ ex post profit ðpe1 ;pe2Þ
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We note that the lemma illustrates the case where
a c
3bðk02 þ k2Þ
 1. For the cases where a c
3bðk02 þ k2Þ
[ 1, the
analysis is exactly the same except that one or two
regions in the table are empty. We discuss these cases
in Appendix S1.
3.2. First-Stage Investment Game
Building on Lemma 1, we now analyze the firms’
investment decisions in the first stage. In this stage,
the firm needs to make capacity investment decisions:
whether to invest in the supplier, and if so, by how
much. In preparation, we first define firms’ expected
profit, given firms’ capacity investment ðk1; k2Þ. We
define an indicator 1C : 1C ¼ 1 if condition C is met
and 0 otherwise. Let Vei ðk1; k2Þ be the firm i’s expected
profit when the capacity investment sizes of the two
firms are ðk1; k2Þ and the two firms follow a subgame
perfect strategy in the quantity game. Applying the
results from Lemma 1, we write Vei ðk1; k2Þ when
k1  k2 as follows. The expressions when k1\ k2 are
symmetric.
Ve1ðk1; k2Þ ¼E pe1ðk1; k2; nÞ
 	 w01fk1[ 0g
wk1 ¼
Z ac
bð3k0
2
þ2k1þk2Þ
0
m2

k0
2
þ k1

nfðnÞdn
þ
Z 1
ac
3bðk0
2
þk2Þ
m0ða cÞ
3b
fðnÞdn
þ
Z ac
3bðk0
2
þk2Þ
ac
bð3k0
2
þ2k1þk2Þ
m1½a c bðk02 þ k2Þn
2b
fðnÞdn
 w01fk1[ 0g  wk1
ð1Þ
Ve2ðk1; k2Þ ¼
Z ac
bð3k0
2
þ2k1þk2Þ
0
m2

k0
2
þ k2

nfðnÞdn
þ
Z 1
ac
3bðk0
2
þk2Þ
m0ða cÞ
3b
fðnÞdn
þ
Z ac
3bðk0
2
þk2Þ
ac
bð3k0
2
þ2k1þk2Þ
m1

k0
2
þ k2

nfðnÞdn
 w01fk2[ 0g  wk2
ð2Þ
For both firms, the expected profit is the sum of three
terms, minus investment costs. The first term repre-
sents the profit when the yield is low and the capacity
is binding, so both firms use up all the available capac-
ity. The second term represents the profit when the
yield is sufficiently large and neither firm is bounded
by its capacity constraint. The third term represents
the case where firm 2 is capacity-constrained, while
firm 1 with more invested capacity is not. With the
induced profit functions, we derive the equilibrium
capacity investment as follows.
There are three possible equilibrium regimes: neither
firm invests, one firm invests, or both firms invest. In each
regime, the investing firm(s) also decides how much
to invest in the supplier. If neither firm investing and
both firms investing are both equilibria, we use the
equilibrium that the firms remain at the status quo and
do not invest in the supplier. This equilibrium is focal
for two reasons. First, at the beginning of the game,
neither firm has invested in the supplier. Thus, neither
firm investing is a natural choice for a focal point. Sec-
ond, it also preserves the continuity of decisions as the
regions where both equilibria exist are adjacent to the
region where neither firm investing is the only equilib-
rium. We next identify the conditions under which
each specific equilibrium arises and show how the
equilibrium evolves from one to another with respect
to the fixed investment cost, w0, and the variable
investment cost, w.
PROPOSITION 1 (FIRM’S EQUILIBRIUM EXCLUSIVE CAPACITY
INVESTMENT). There exist two equilibrium switching
curves, we0ðwÞ and we0ðwÞ, such that we0ðwÞ  we0ðwÞ,
and
i) When the fixed cost is small ðw0  we0ðwÞÞ, both
firms invest ke in the supplier. The equilibrium
capacity, ke decreases in w and follows
kf, k :
Z ac
3bðk0
2
þkÞ
0
a c 3b k0
2
þ k
 
n

 
nfðnÞdn w ¼ 0
8><
>:
9>=
>;: ð3Þ
Furthermore, there exists a function we0ðwÞ such
that the equilibrium leads to a prisoner’s dilemma
in the region for all w 2 ½we0ðwÞ;we0ðwÞ. Under the
prisoner’s dilemma we have Vei ðke; keÞ  Vei ð0; 0Þ
for i = 1,2.
ii) When the fixed cost is intermediate
ðwe0ðwÞ\w0  we0ðwÞÞ, only one firm invests in
the supplier, where the equilibrium capacity, ke1,
decreases in w and follows
ke1,
(
k :
Z ac
bð3k0
2
þ2kÞ
0
a c b 3k0
2
þ 2k
 
n

 
nfðnÞdn w ¼ 0
)
:
ð4Þ
iii) When the fixed cost is high ðw0 [ we0ðwÞÞ, neither
firm invests.
Furthermore, we0ðwÞ and we0ðwÞ decrease in the variable
cost w.
The equilibrium can be seen in Figure 1. For a
given variable cost w, we observe that the number
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of investing firms decreases as the fixed cost w0
increases. When the fixed investment cost is fairly
low, that is, w0  we0ðwÞ, both firms invest in the
supplier’s capacity. The level of invested capacity,
however, is determined by the variable cost w, as
shown in Equation (3). When the fixed investment
cost is close to the threshold we0ðwÞ, as both firms
find it dominant to invest, both firms can be
trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma, where both firms
earn a lower profit than what they would have
earned if neither firm had invested. While over-
investment in capacity also occurs when
w0  we0ðwÞ, in this case, the fixed investment cost is
not big enough relative to the firms’ profit, thus the
firms are not trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Therefore, the prisoner’s dilemma equilibrium
arises as a combination of both over-investment in
capacity and the non-negligible fixed investment
cost. When the fixed capacity cost is moderate, that
is, we0ðwÞ\w0  we0ðwÞ, an asymmetric equilibrium
where only one firm invests is sustained. In this
regime, the investing firm gains enough profit
being the capacity leader, while the non-investing
firm finds it not necessary to invest because the
gain from investment is limited and not enough to
cover the costs. When the fixed capacity cost is
very high, that is, we0ðwÞ\w0, neither firm invests,
and each firm will rely on the supplier’s base
capacity.
For a given fixed cost w0, we also observe that fewer
firm invests as the variable capacity cost w increases.
When both firms invest, an increase in w has both a
direct and an indirect impact on the firms’ profits. As
w increases, the firms are less incentivized to invest in
the capacity (ke decreases in w,) and as a result, this
negatively affects the buying firm’s capacity and
profit. On the other hand, as w increases, the capacity
of both firms decreases. This increases the market
price and positively affects the firm’s profit. There-
fore, whether an increase in the variable cost will
increase or decrease the firm’s profit will depend on
the relative magnitude of the two effects, and this is
why we observe the non-monotonicity in the
prisoner’s dilemma region (see the dashed line in
Figure 1).
When only one firm invests, a higher variable cost
decreases investment level and the investing firm’s
profit. Therefore, if the investing firm’s profit is less
than the profit with no firm investing at a given w,
then the same equilibrium holds when w is even
higher: This is why the switching curve we0ðwÞ
decreases in w. With exclusive capacity, however, a
decrease in the investing firm’s capacity lowers quan-
tity and raises the market price. Therefore, the non-
investing firm’s profit increases in w. We observe that
as w increases, this increase in the non-investing
firm’s profit when only one firm invests outweighs
the possibility to increase the firms’ profit when both
firms invest. Thus, we observe the monotonicity in
the equilibrium switching curve we0ðwÞ.
4. First-Priority Capacity Contract
Under this contract, the invested capacity will be
used first for the investing firm, and any leftover
can be used to fulfill other orders. The sequence of
events is the same as before. In any equilibrium, we
observe that only the firm with smaller capacity
may tap into the leftover capacity. To see why, sup-
pose one firm (say firm 1) invests in more capacity
than the other firm. Since the firms engage in Cour-
not competition, it can be shown that if firm 2 has
any leftover, then firm 1 has leftover in equilibrium.
On the other hand, the converse is not necessarily
true. Consequently, in any equilibrium, only the
firm with smaller capacity can access the leftover,
that is, firm 2 can now order up to ks  q1 instead
of ðk02 þ k2Þn: When firm 2 invests in more capacity
than firm 1, the analysis is symmetric, thus omitted.
The equilibrium outcome of the following quantity
game is shown in Lemma 2.
pf1ðk1; k2; nÞ ¼ max
q1 ðk02 Þn
q1Pðq1; q2Þ  cq1; and
pf2ðk1; k2; nÞ ¼ max
q2 ðksq1Þ
q2Pðq1; q2Þ  cq2:
LEMMA 2 (FIRMS’ EQUILIBRIUM ORDER QUANTITY AND EX
POST PROFIT). Let the capacity investment sizes be ðk1; k2Þ,
and the resulting subgame yields the following:
Figure 1 Equilibrium Investment Outcomes with Exclusive Capacity
“neither”: neither firm invests. “one”: one firm invests. “both”: both firms
invest.
Qi, Ahn, and Sinha: Investing in a Shared Supplier
1542 Production and Operations Management 24(10), pp. 1537–1551, © 2015 Production and Operations Management Society
Under any realization of ξ, only one of the two out-
comes arises: either the entire capacity is exhausted,
or there is still leftover capacity and neither firm is
constrained by its capacity. There does not exist a
situation where only one firm has exhausted its
capacity, while the other firm still has leftover. This
result is not surprising when ξ is very low (so the
capacity is really tight) or ξ is very high (so the
capacity is sufficiently large), but even when the
realized capacity is moderate, a c
bð3k02 þ 2k1 þ k2Þ
\ n 
2ða cÞ
3bðk0 þ k1 þ k2Þ, a situation where only one firm’s
invested capacity is used up does not occur.
Intuitively, the firm with less capacity has incentive
to use leftover because the benefit from satisfying
more demand beyond its own invested capacity
dominates the negative impact of the lower market
price. On the other hand, because firms engage in
the Cournot competition, if the non-investing firm
does not want to access the leftover capacity, the
investing firm will also find it not profitable to use
the leftover to produce more. Thus, when the
capacity type is first-priority, either the entire
capacity is exhausted, or neither firm is constrained
by capacity. The following result presents the
investment outcome for the first-priority capacity.
PROPOSITION 2 (FIRMS’ EQUILIBRIUM FIRST-PRIORITY CAPAC-
ITY INVESTMENT). There exist two equilibrium switching
curves, w
f
0ðwÞ and wf0ðwÞ, such that wf0ðwÞ  wf0ðwÞ and
i) When the fixed cost w0 is low ðw0  wf0ðwÞÞ, both
firms invest in the supplier, where the equilibrium
capacity, kf , decreases in w and is given by
kf, k :
Z ac
3bðk0
2
þkÞ
0
a c 3b

k0
2
þ k

n

 
nfðnÞdn w ¼ 0
8><
>:
9>=
>;: ð5Þ
Furthermore, there exists a function w
f
0ðwÞ such
that a prisoner’s dilemma arises between w
f
0ðwÞ
and w
f
0ðwÞ: Vfi ðkf ; kfÞ  Vfi ð0; 0Þ for i = 1,2.
ii) When the fixed cost w0 is intermediate
ðwf0ðwÞ\w0  wf0ðwÞÞ, the spillover effect occurs
and only one firm invests in the supplier, where
the equilibrium capacity, k
f
1, decreases in w and is
given by
k
f
1, k :
Z ac
bð3k0
2
þ2kÞ
0
a c b 3k0
2
þ 2k
 
n

 
nfðnÞdn
þ
Z 2ðacÞ
3bðk0þkÞ
ac
bð3k0
2
þ2kÞ
2 a c b k0 þ kð Þn½ 
nfðnÞdn w ¼ 0
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
9>>>>>=
>>>>>;
:
ð6Þ
iii) When the fixed cost w0 is high ðw0 [ wf0ðwÞÞ,
neither firm invests.
Furthermore, w
f
0ðwÞ decreases in w.
The structure of the equilibrium is similar to Propo-
sition 1: as w0 increases, the equilibrium shifts from
two firms investing, to one firm investing, and finally
to no firm investing. We also observe that the switch-
ing curve w
f
0ðwÞ decreases in w. However, with first-
priority capacity, we observe that the spillover where
the non-investing firm uses the leftover occurs in an
equilibrium where one firm invests. To understand
why the spillover does not occur under the other two
regions, we first note that firms are able to access the
same capacity level in both cases, as the firms make
the same level of investment in equilibrium in a Cour-
not market. Consequently, both firms exhaust all the
available capacity or both have leftover. Furthermore,
the firm’s investment decision is affected by the spill-
over. This is reflected by the second term in condition
(6):
R 2ða cÞ
3bðk0 þ kÞ
a c
bð3k0
2
þ 2kÞ
 2½a  c  bðk0 þ kÞnnfðnÞdn. In this
case, the realized capacity is moderately high, and the
benefit from the investment that allows the firm to
access more capacity, is dominated by the loss due to
the decreasing market price (this happens because the
non-investing firm accesses the leftover and intensi-
fies competition). Thus, the investing firm is more
likely to build a smaller capacity.
Finally, we notice the switching curve w
f
0ðwÞ is not
necessarily monotone in w due to the spillover effect.
Realized yield ξ Order quantity ðq1 ; q2 Þ ex post profit pe1 ;pe2
 
0  n  a  c
b

3k0
2 þ 2k1 þ k2
  k0
2
þ k1

n;

k0
2
þ k2

n
 
m2

k0
2
þ k1

n;m2

k0
2
þ k2

n
 
a  c
b

3k0
2
þ 2k1 þ k2
 \ n  2ða  cÞ
3bðk0 þ k1 þ k2Þ

a  c
b
 ks ; 2ks  a  c
b
 
m2

a  c
b
 ks

;m2

2ks  a  c
b

2ða  cÞ
3bðk0 þ k1 þ k2Þ  n  1

a  c
3b
;
a  c
3b
  
m0

a  c
3b
;
m0

a  c
3b
!
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The investing firm’s profit decreases in the variable
cost w and therefore the equilibrium switching curve
we0ðwÞ that defines the one firm investing regime
decreases in w. However, the non-investing firm’s
profit does not necessarily increase with respect to w
(we observe that the profit of the non-investing firm
increases in w in the exclusive capacity case.) While a
higher w leads to a lower invested capacity and raises
the price in the Cournot market, the non-investing
firm may access the investing firm’s leftover capacity.
Thus, when the investing firm lowers the capacity
level, it could decrease the non-investing firm’s avail-
able capacity and resultant profit. Therefore, the non-
investing firm’s profit may increase or decrease in the
variable capacity cost w, depending on which effect is
stronger. Thus, we observe the equilibrium switching
curve we0ðwÞ is not necessarily monotone in the vari-
able cost w as shown in Figure 2.
5. Spillover Effect: Comparing
Exclusive and First-Priority Capacity
In sections 3 and 4, we identified three equilibrium
regimes—neither firm investing, one firm investing,
and both firms investing, as well as how the equilib-
rium and its capacity level change in the capacity cost.
We learned that the main difference between the two
capacity types is that the first-priority capacity leads
to a spillover equilibrium. In this section, we are inter-
ested in how the spillover effect affects the equilib-
rium outcomes, and as a result, the buying firms’ and
supplier’s preference about the capacity type.
5.1. Impact on the Equilibrium Outcomes
At first glance, it seems that the spillover effect will
always intensify competition because it gives both
firms greater flexibility to access the supplier’s capac-
ity. However, our analysis shows that, in spite of this
added flexibility, the spillover effect indeed discour-
ages firms from investing in their supplier. Therefore,
it can decrease both the number of investing firms
and the capacity levels. As firms invest less aggres-
sively, the spillover mitigates the risk of both firms
being trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma. Our next
proposition formally summarizes these impacts.
PROPOSITION 3 (IMPACT OF SPILLOVER EFFECT ON THE EQUI-
LIBRIUM OUTCOMES).
i) The number of investing firms is higher with exclu-
sive capacity than with first-priority capacity, that
is, w
f
0ðwÞ  we0ðwÞ and wf0ðwÞ  we0ðwÞ.
ii) The total capacity is larger with exclusive capacity
than with first-priority capacity.
iii) The prisoner’s dilemma region is larger with
exclusive capacity than with first-priority capacity,
that is, ½wf0ðwÞ;wf0ðwÞ  ½we0ðwÞ;we0ðwÞ for all w.
With the first-priority capacity, it looks as if compe-
tition is intensified with firms’ access to each other’s
leftover. This is true if the supplier’s total capacity
level remains the same for both contracts: more units
are produced and the market clearing price is lower
with the first-priority capacity. However, the result
shows, because firms can access the other firm’s left-
over capacity and do not need as much invested
capacity as before, firms are less motivated to invest.
Therefore, firms invest less under the first-priority
capacity and the spillover effect indeed curbs compe-
tition in two ways. First, by Proposition 3(i), the num-
ber of investing firms is lower with the first-priority
capacity than with the exclusive capacity. Thus, in a
region where both firms invest with exclusive capac-
ity, it is possible that only one firm invests with first-
priority capacity. Similarly, in a region where one
firm invests with exclusive capacity, neither firm may
invest with first-priority capacity. Second, in Proposi-
tion 3(ii), we observe that when only one firm invests,
the invested capacity level is lower with first-priority
capacity, and when there are more firms investing
with exclusive capacity, the invested capacity level is
also lower with first-priority capacity, indicating that
the spillover effect decreases the total capacity.
Proposition 3(iii) shows the prisoner’s dilemma
region is smaller with the first-priority capacity. With
first-priority capacity, the non-investing firm is less
incentivized to invest aggressively as it can access the
leftover. As a result, over-investment is less likely to
occur and so is the prisoner’s dilemma.
5.2. Capacity Type Preference of Buying Firms and
the Supplier
We next analyze the implication of the spillover effect
on the firms’ and supplier’s profit and their prefer-
ence of the capacity types. In particular, we further
Figure 2 Equilibrium Investment Outcomes with First-Priority Capacity
“neither”: neither firm invests. “one”: one firm invests. “both”: both firms
invest.
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investigate which capacity type the buying firms and
supplier would prefer.
Buying firms’ preference. The preference of buying
firms is driven by two main effects: the leading effect
associated with being the only investor, and the
spillover effect that occurs with the first-priority capac-
ity. When only one firm invests, the advantage of
accessing more capacity allows this firm to extract
more profit from the market than the non-investing
firm. On the other hand, with the spillover effect the
non-investing firm is able to access the leftover capac-
ity invested by the other firm. Consequently, the buy-
ing firm’s preference depends on which of the two
effects is stronger.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under exclu-
sive and first-priority capacity in Propositions 1 and
2, two cases arise: the one-firm-investing region does
not overlap, that is, we0ðwÞ  wf0ðwÞ as shown in Fig-
ure 3a, or the one-firm-investing region overlaps, that
is, we0ðwÞ\wf0ðwÞ as shown in Figure 3b. We first
illustrate the results for the non-overlapping case in
the proposition below, and then extend the analysis
to the overlapping case. We note that when the one-
firm-investing regions do not overlap, the analysis for
firms’ preference is symmetric and it does not matter
which firm becomes the investing firm when only one
firm invests. Therefore, without loss of generality, we
assume the investing firm is firm 1 when only one
firm invests in this case.
PROPOSITION 4 (BUYING FIRMS’ CAPACITY TYPE PREFERENCE
WHEN we0ðwÞ  wf0ðwÞ).
i) When 0  w0\wf0ðwÞ, the firms are indifferent
between the exclusive and first-priority capacity,
as both firms invest the same amount in both set-
tings.
ii) When w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\wf0ðwÞ, both firms prefer
first-priority capacity (with only one firm invest-
ing) over exclusive capacity (where both firms
would invest).
iii) When w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ, both firms prefer
first-priority capacity (with neither firm investing)
over exclusive capacity (where both firms would
invest).
iv) When we0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ, firm 1 prefers the
exclusive capacity while firm 2 prefers the first-pri-
ority capacity.
v) When w0  we0ðwÞ, the firms are indifferent
between the exclusive and first-priority capacity, as
neither firm invests.
The results are presented in Figure 4a. Proposition
4(i) shows that if both firms invest, that is,
0  w0\wf0ðwÞ, the firms are indifferent between the
two capacity types. To understand this, we notice that
both firms compete in the Cournot market and both
firms invest in the same capacity level. Therefore,
both firms will either exhaust all the available capac-
ity or have some capacity leftover. This makes the
first-priority capacity de facto exclusive. Similarly,
when neither firm invests, that is, w0  we0ðwÞ as
shown in Proposition 4 (v), both firms will be able to
access the same capacity level, and therefore the first-
priority capacity is also de facto exclusive. In these two
cases, the firms are indifferent about capacity types.
In other cases, one may expect that the investing
firm should always prefer the exclusive capacity and
disallow the other firm from accessing its leftover.
However, our analysis indicates that this is not
(b)
(a)
Figure 3 Two Equilibrium Paths to Illustrate Buying Firms’ Preference about the Capacity Types
The light-gray area in (b) indicates the overlapping one-firm-investing region.
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always the case. In the range w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\wf0ðwÞ, the
exclusive capacity will trigger firm 2 to invest and
firm 1 will lose the benefit from the leading effect
under the first-priority capacity. Therefore, firm 1 pre-
fers to grant its competitor access to its invested
capacity as shown in Proposition 4(ii). In this case,
firm 2 also prefers the first-priority capacity in the
hope of being able to free-ride on the investing firm’s
leftover.
Finally, in the middle range, w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ,
both firms prefer the first-priority capacity (where no
firm invests) to the exclusive capacity (where both
firms invest). This is a direct consequence of the spill-
over effect: the spillover prevents firms from over-
investment and being trapped in the prisoner’s
dilemma.
We next consider the case with overlapped one-
firm-investing regions as shown in Figure 3b. As the
fixed cost w0 increases, there are also five regions to
analyze. Except for the overlapped one-firm investing
region, that is, we0ðwÞ  w0\wf0ðwÞ, the equilibrium
outcomes in the other four regions are the same as in
the non-overlapping case (subcase i, ii, iv, and v).
Therefore, we focus on the overlapped one-firm-
investing region, we0ðwÞ  w0\wf0ðwÞ.
When we0ðwÞ  w0\wf0ðwÞ, only one firm invests in
equilibrium regardless of the capacity type. In this
range, two distinct cases arise as w0 changes. In the
first case, the firm which invests under the exclusive
capacity, also invests when the capacity type is first-
priority, and without loss of generality, we label the
investing firm as firm 1. In the second case, the firm
which invests when the capacity type is exclusive is
different from the firm which invests when the capac-
ity type is first-priority. Without loss of generality, we
label the investing firm under the exclusive capacity
as firm 1 and the investing firm under the first-prior-
ity capacity as firm 2. We summarize the firms’ pref-
erence in the corollary below.
COROLLARY 1 (BUYING FIRMS’ CAPACITY TYPE PREFERENCE
WHEN we0ðwÞ\wf0ðwÞ). When we0ðwÞ  w0\wf0ðwÞ,
firm 1 prefers the exclusive capacity and firm 2 prefers
the first-priority capacity.
The firms’ capacity type preference is shown in Fig-
ure 4b. When the same firm (firm 1) invests in equilib-
rium under both capacity types, the investing firm
gains more when the capacity is exclusive than when
the capacity is first-priority. Therefore, the investing
firm (firm 1) prefers exclusive capacity. On the other
hand, the non-investing firm (firm 2) prefers first-
priority capacity for the benefit of free-riding on the
investing firm’s leftover.
When the investing firm is different under both
capacity types, the investing firm under exclu-
sive capacity (firm 1) gains more under the exclusive
capacity than it does as the non-investing firm under
the first-priority capacity. Therefore, firm 1 prefers
the exclusive capacity. On the other hand, the invest-
ing firm under the first-priority capacity (firm 2)
gains more under the first-priority capacity. This is
(a)
(b)
Figure 4 The Buying Firms’ Preference about the Capacity Types
In the overlapped one-firm-investing region in (b) (the light-gray region we0ðwÞ  w0 \wf0ðwÞ): only one firm invests under either capacity type, so there are
two cases: firm 1 invests under both capacity types, or firm 1 invests under the exclusive capacity and firm 2 invests under the first-priority capacity.
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because firm 2 enjoys benefit of the leading effect
under the first-priority capacity, while it suffers for
not being able to access the other firm’s leftover as
the non-investing firm under the exclusive capacity.
Thus, firm 2, the investing firm under the first-prior-
ity capacity, prefers the first-priority capacity over
the exclusive capacity. In other words, firm 2 would
like to grant its competitor access to its invested
capacity. We next discuss the supplier’s preference
about the capacity types.
Supplier’s preference. The supplier’s expected
profit with the exclusive and first-priority capacity,
Ves and V
f
s, when firms invest in ðk1; k2Þ and
k1  k2 are as follows. The expressions are sym-
metric when k1\ k2. Recall that the supplier’s real-
ized capacity is denoted by ks ¼ ðk0 þ k1 þ k2Þn,
and c is the unit profit.
Vesðk1; k2Þ ¼
Z ac
bð3k0
2
þ2k1þk2Þ
0
cksfðnÞdn
þ
Z ac
3bðk0
2
þk2Þ
ac
bð3k0
2
þ2k1þk2Þ
c
a c
2b
þ k0
2
þ k2
 
n
2

 
fðnÞdn
þ
Z 1
ac
3bðk0
2
þk2Þ
2cða cÞ
3b
fðnÞdn
ð7Þ
Vfsðk1; k2Þ ¼
Z 2ðacÞ
3bðk0þk1þk2Þ
0
cksfðnÞdn
þ
Z 1
2ðacÞ
3bðk0þk1þk2Þ
2cða cÞ
3b
fðnÞdn ð8Þ
Comparing the supplier’s profits under the two
contacts leads to a few interesting observations. From
the supplier’s perspective, the spillover is a two-
edged sword. While the spillover effect improves the
capacity utilization of the supplier, it also reduces the
supplier’s total capacity as shown in Proposition 3.
Therefore, it is not obvious how the supplier should
prefer the exclusive capacity vs. the first-priority
capacity.
However, we show that if the fixed investment cost
is low, both firms invest and the supplier is indiffer-
ent about capacity types since both types induce the
same amount of investment in the supplier. If the
fixed cost is high, the supplier is also indifferent
between the capacity types since neither firm invests
in the supplier anyway. In between, if more firms
invest with exclusive capacity, the supplier benefits
from the over-investment with exclusive capacity
more than the flexibility with first-priority capacity.
Similar to the discussions on buying firms’ prefer-
ence, we first illustrate the results for the case where
the one-firm-investing regions do not overlap as
shown in Figure 3a, and then we extend the discus-
sion to the overlapped case as shown in Figure 3b.
PROPOSITION 5 (SUPPLIER’S CAPACITY TYPE PREFERENCE
WHEN we0ðwÞ  wf0ðwÞ).
i) When 0  w0\wf0ðwÞ or w0  we0ðwÞ, the sup-
plier is indifferent between the exclusive and first-
priority capacity.
ii) When w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ, the supplier prefers
the exclusive capacity.
The results are illustrated in Figure 5a. Proposition
5(i) shows that if both firms invest or neither firm
invests, the supplier is indifferent between the two
types. This follows the discussion after Proposition 4
that the first-priority capacity is de facto exclusive in
both cases, as firms compete in the Cournot market
and have the same capacity level.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5 The Supplier’s Preference about the Capacity Types
Qi, Ahn, and Sinha: Investing in a Shared Supplier
Production and Operations Management 24(10), pp. 1537–1551, © 2015 Production and Operations Management Society 1547
Proposition 5(ii) implies that in regions
w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ, the supplier prefers the
exclusive capacity to the first-priority capacity. In
this region, the exclusive capacity results in strictly
more firms investing. In the region where
w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\wf0ðwÞ, both firms invest under the
exclusive contract and one firm invests under the first-
priority contract. Under the exclusive contract, both
firms invest in the same capacity level in the supplier,
and therefore either both firms will use up the
invested capacity or both of them will have some left-
over. That is, the supplier’s capacity is utilized effi-
ciently despite the exclusive claims. In addition, the
total capacity invested by both firms with the exclu-
sive capacity is higher than the total capacity invested
by the one investing firm with the first-priority capac-
ity. Therefore, the supplier is able to earn a higher
profit with exclusive capacity and prefers the exclu-
sive capacity to the first-priority capacity. In the region
where w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ, neither firm invests
under the first-priority contract and both firms invest
under the exclusive contract, so the supplier is able to
extract more profit from leveraging the additional
invested capacity and it also prefers the exclusive
capacity. Following a similar logic, in the region where
we0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ, neither firm invests under the
first-priority contract and one firm invests under the
exclusive contract, the supplier also prefers the exclu-
sive capacity. These results are also shown in Figure
5a.
We next consider the case when the one-firm-
investing regions overlap (w
f
0ðwÞ  w0\we0ðwÞ). Sim-
ilar to the discussions on buying firms’ preference,
most of the results in Proposition 2 hold. However,
we note that the supplier’s preference is not trivial
when the fixed cost w0 is between we0ðwÞ and wf0ðwÞ. In
this case, only one firm invests under both contracts,
and the supplier gains more capacity investment with
the exclusive capacity but loses the flexibility in using
it. Intuitively, if the realized yield is small, the sup-
plier may benefit from the over-investment with
exclusive capacity. If the yield is moderately high, the
supplier may benefit from the flexibility in utilizing
the first-priority capacity. If the yield is high, the sup-
plier is indifferent between the two capacity types as
there is enough capacity to produce with either type.
Thus, depending on which of the two effects domi-
nates, the supplier’s preference may change. Its pref-
erence depends on the parameters such as the
distribution of the yield and the variable cost to invest
in the capacity. The supplier’s ex post profit is illus-
trated in Figure 6a. To further explore the supplier’s
preference between the two capacity types in this
case, we conduct a numerical study below.
In Figure 7, we present a numerical example show-
ing how the difference in the supplier’s profit
between exclusive and first-priority contracts changes
in the variable capacity cost w, and the distribution of
the yield ξ when only one firm invests in the supplier.
The first key observation is that the benefit from over-
investment in the exclusive capacity tends to domi-
nate the benefit from the flexibility in the first-priority
capacity, that is, Vesðke1; 0Þ  Vfsðkf1; 0Þ  0. Let us take
a closer look at one particular case of the ex post sup-
plier’s profit difference as shown in Figure 6b. It is
clear that the region where the profit with exclusive
capacity is greater than the profit with first-priority
capacity, is greater than the other region, where the
profit with exclusive capacity is smaller than the
profit with first-priority capacity. This further con-
firms the conjecture that the over-investment benefit
dominates the flexibility benefit. As the yield follows
a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, we have that
the ex ante expected profit with exclusive capacity is
(a) (b)
Figure 6 The Supplier’s ex post Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Profit when Only One Firm Invests (a); A Numerical Example of the ex post Profit
Difference (b)
Parameters in (b): a = 10, b = 1, c = 1, w = 0.1, yield distribution U[0,1], and supplier’s base capacity k0 ¼ 7.
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higher. Other cases are similar. While in this numeri-
cal example we illustrate that the benefit from the
over-invested exclusive capacity often dominates the
benefit from the flexibility in utilizing the first-priority
capacity under the uniform yield distribution, the
exact preference depends on the problem parameters
and yield distribution in a general case.
Discussions on supply chain capacity. We have
discussed different stakeholders’ preference about the
capacity type. Which capacity type will be eventually
chosen is a complicated bargaining problem with the
three stakeholders of the supply chain holding their
own preferences. In the following discussions, we con-
sider two extreme scenarios: the supplier decides the
capacity type, or the investing firm decides the capac-
ity type. The scenario in which the supplier chooses
the capacity is appropriate when the supplier has a
stronger bargaining power to dictate which type of
capacity is to be installed at his site. We also consider
the second scenario where the investing firm has a
stronger bargaining power and determines the capac-
ity type. As observed in the Foxconn–Sharp example
discussed in the introduction, Foxconn as a buying
firm effectively dictated that the capacity type be
exclusive. We next discuss the two scenarios in detail.
• Supplier determines the capacity type. In this case,
the supplier chooses the capacity type that will
benefit him more, and the supplier is often bet-
ter off under the exclusive capacity because
doing so induces over-investment. The only
exception to this happens when both the exclu-
sive capacity and the first-priority capacity
result in only one firm investing in equilib-
rium, that is, when w0 2 ½we0ðwÞ; wf0ðwÞ. In this
case, the supplier needs to consider the trade-
off between the larger but less flexible exclu-
sive capacity and the smaller but more flexible
first-priority capacity, as illustrated in Figure 6.
• Investing firm(s) decides the capacity type. When
the investing firm decides the capacity type, a
naive intuition would suggest that the investing
firm should always claim exclusive use of its
invested capacity. Although the intuition coin-
cides with the equilibrium when the fixed cost
is moderately high, that is, w0 2 ½we0ðwÞ; we0ðwÞ,
Figure 4 shows that this is not always the case.
In particular, when the fixed cost is moderately
low, that is, w0 2 ½wf0ðwÞ;we0ðwÞ, the investing
firm is better off under the first-priority capac-
ity. In this case, claiming exclusive use of the
invested capacity triggers both firms to invest.
In equilibrium one of the firms (say firm 1)
invests under both the exclusive and first-prior-
ity scenarios, while the other firm (firm 2)
invests in the exclusive capacity scenario but
not in the first-priority scenario. From both
firms’ perspective, they are better off under the
first-priority capacity. To see why, note that
firm 1 is better off granting its competitor access
to its invested capacity and keeping its leading
position in the market. Firm 2 also prefers the
first-priority capacity because it is forced to
invest under the exclusive capacity and gets
trapped in a worse situation. As a result, the
investing firms (under the exclusive or the first-
priority capacity) prefer the first-priority capac-
ity to the exclusive capacity.
Finally, we also acknowledge that the supply chain
capacity type choice problem, which involves a multi-
party negotiation, is still an open question. This is
because, beyond these two scenarios, a number of fac-
tors (e.g., detailed sequence and rules of negotiation)
can significantly influence which capacity type will
emerge as an outcome of the three-party game.
Although this is beyond the scope of this study, we
believe that this can be an interesting future research
question, following the recent emerging literature
stream on bargaining in the supply chain setting, c.f.,
Lovejoy (2010) and Feng and Lu (2012).
6. Conclusion
We investigate two capacity contract structures that
firms may engage in when investing in expansion of a
shared supplier’s capacity. We characterize the equi-
librium outcomes, identify conditions about when
and to what extent the spillover effect and prisoner’s
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Figure 7 The Supplier’s Expected Profit Difference V es ðk e1 ; 0Þ
V fs ðk f1 ; 0Þ
We notice that V es ðk e1 ; 0Þ  V fs ðk f1 ; 0Þ ¼ V es ð0; k e1 Þ  V fs ð0; kf1Þ. Parame-
ters: a = 10, b = 1, c = 1, supplier’s base capacity k0 ¼ 7 and the yield
distribution U[low,1] where the low value increases from 0 to 0.99.
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dilemma occur, and analyze the impact of the spill-
over effect on the equilibrium outcomes, and firms’
and supplier’s capacity type preferences.
Managerially, therefore, firms considering invest-
ing in suppliers who also supply their competitors
must consider the consequences of their investment
via the lens of a multi-player game, rather than myo-
pically focusing on increased access to capacity. Plac-
ing restrictions on the supplier that are too tight may
backfire in the form of competitors also jumping in
with their own investments, which is reflected by the
fact that more firms tend to invest and firms tend to
over-invest with exclusive capacity in our model. We
show that the spillover has both positive and nega-
tive effects on the investing firm. On the surface,
allowing the spillover increases the end-market com-
petition as more products are produced by both
firms for a given capacity. On the other hand, allow-
ing the non-investing firm to share the leftover
capacity can actually disincentivize a need for invest-
ment, and, consequently, both firms may avoid being
trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma. Depending on two
effects, the leading effect and the spillover effect for
buying firms, different capacity types may be prefer-
able. While the non-investing firm always prefers the
first-priority capacity, the investing firm does not
always want to shut off the other firm from accessing
its invested capacity. By allowing access to the left-
over, both firms could be better off. We also show
that the supplier’s preference is driven by the trade-
off between the over-investment in the exclusive
capacity vs. the flexibility in utilizing the smaller
first-priority capacity.
The results and insights of our study help us to
understand the sequence of events that happened in
the Foxconn–Sharp–Samsung case. Although there
are many factors that affect Foxconn and Samsung’s
investment decisions, we highlight one particular fac-
tor in this case: Competing firms invest in a supplier
to gain capacity. Despite its financial troubles, Sharp
still maintains superior technology advantage in pro-
ducing the LCD screens with the IGZO technology,
and the factory in partnership with Hon Hai is the
only one capable of producing the industry’s largest
sheets of glass panels (Osawa and Lee 2013). There-
fore, it is critical for firms to secure supply from Sharp
to maintain competitive advantage in the future.
Driven by this motivation, Foxconn invested to secure
50% capacity of Sharp’s Sakai factory, while Samsung
also invested to prevent competitors to gain too much
control over Sharp, and secure a steady supply of
LCD panels. This competition for access to capacity is
precisely what this paper considers, and this invest-
ment relationship is reflected in our model. As our
analysis suggests, firms have to consider both direct
and indirect consequences of their investment when
they share a supplier with a competitor. Being too
aggressive and claiming too much capacity may
backfire as competitors may jump in with their
own investment to prevent the firm from gaining a
priority.
Our paper suggests several other directions for
future research. One counterpart of our work could
consider equilibrium outcomes if investments are
used to reduce the uncertainty in the yield, rather
than increase capacity. At a more general level, with
the increasing trend of decentralized, networked, yet
cooperative supply chains, the inter-dependency of
the contractual relationship for one pair of agents
with other agents could lead to unexpected outcomes.
For example, what are the consequences of acquiring
a supplier in such an environment? We believe
there are several fruitful opportunities for research
in this area.
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